

Epistemic negligence
Giulia Luvisotto

According to one prominent view, call it the *infracation view*, someone is responsible for their beliefs in the sense that they are blameworthy for violating an epistemic norm. Or, in a weaker version, if someone is responsible for their beliefs, then they are blameworthy for violating an epistemic norm. After having expanded on this account and shown its fortune, I will argue that it generates two difficulties: first, it is unable to explain why we are not always criticisable for violating epistemic norms; second, it doesn't provide any satisfactory explanation of the relationship between responsibility for beliefs and responsibility for the activities that constitute belief-formation. In the second part, I provide a revised notion of 'negligence' that I believe can accommodate both difficulties. I conclude by claiming that despite this revised notion is in principle compatible with the infraction view, it highlights in effect that the infraction view and its focus on someone's violation of epistemic norms can provide at best a partial picture of what it is to be responsible for beliefs. Thus, a revised notion of negligence seems to undermine the whole project of the infraction view and suggests that we might have to rephrase the terms of the issue from the beginning. To delineate this novel account of 'negligence', I will draw on recent work by Barbara Herman.

Bio

I am a PhD candidate at the University of Warwick, where I explore the notion of 'responsibility for mental attitudes' under the supervision of Johannes Roessler. In particular, given that this phenomenon lies at the crossroads of quite a few debates, I am interested in how we can (and should) set up the questions we ask. I focus on the related notions of control, evaluation, norm, attributability.