

Conceptual Ethics, Meta-Epistemology and The Foundations of Epistemic Normativity

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This paper advertises the importance of distinguishing three different foundational projects concerning the epistemic, which we call normative epistemic inquiry, metaepistemic inquiry, and the conceptual ethics of epistemology. We argue that these projects can be distinguished by their contrasting constitutive success conditions. We argue further that because of these contrasts, explicit attention to the distinction between them is a valuable resource for philosophical work on the epistemic. For example, we argue that carefully distinguishing these projects allows us to: (a) better understand and evaluate existing views; (b) identify and appreciate new or underexplored theoretical options; (c) avoid merely verbal disputes that can hinder intellectual progress, and (d) help us to understand the relationship between epistemology and the deepest normative questions concerning what we ought to believe, and how we ought to live.