

Emotional Reactions and Ascriptions of Value

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An ascription of intrinsic value, or disvalue, to an object plays an important role in the critical scrutiny of motivational and emotional attitudes taken towards that object. Yet, such attitudes also play an apparent epistemic role in ascertaining whether an object has intrinsic value. How do these two observations sit together? In particular, do they in combination provide a case for a dispositional theory that identifies the concept $\langle x \text{ having value} \rangle$ with the concept $\langle x \text{ evoking a motivational or emotional response under an epistemically ideal condition with respect to } x \rangle$? These are the questions that set the inquiry undertaken in this paper. The aim is not to defend such a dispositional theory of the concept of value but, rather, to gain insights into what it takes to give an adequate account of the concept of value in question.