

# What is Epistemic Normativity (and Is There any such Thing)?

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**Abstract** In addition to rational and to moral normativity, there appears to be a third basic kind of normativity, which is epistemic. While rational normativity focuses on what is good for us, and moral normativity on what is good simpliciter, epistemic normativity is concerned with truth. For example, in questions of the form *What should S believe concerning p?* the ‘should’ is standardly interpreted in an epistemic way: it is asked what belief of *S* concerning *p* is most likely to be true. The epistemic reading of normative terms in such questions and similar sentences is widely held to be irreducible to rational or moral normativity. Against this opinion, I will argue that epistemic normativity is not a third basic kind of normativity, but rather is reducible to, and thus a subcategory of, moral normativity. In order to reach this aim, I will present an argument to the point that evidentialism – the view that we should believe in accordance with the evidence we have – is correct, but that the normativity involved is to be understood in moral rather than epistemic terms.

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