

Determinative, Contributive and Evidential Reasons

Abstract

Several differences between practical and epistemic reasons have been adduced in the literature. In this paper, I discern a hitherto unknown difference between practical and epistemic reasons to the familiar ones, invoking a tripartite distinction, also unfamiliar, between kinds of reason: evidential, determinative and contributive reasons. Invoking this tripartite distinction, I argue for three claims. First, the three categories are increasingly more demanding, so that a contributive reason is also determinative and evidential, and a determinative reason is also evidential. Second, epistemic reasons are always evidential, seldom determinative and never contributive. Third, practical reasons are always evidential, invariably determinative, and often, although not invariably, contributive.

Biographical Note

Ruth Weintraub is Professor of Philosophy at Tel-Aviv University. Her publications include *The Sceptical Challenge* (1997), as well as articles in epistemology, on paradoxes and the philosophy of David Hume.

Website: <https://english.tau.ac.il/profile/weintrar>