

Making the Unity of Normativity Safe Again

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1. Introduction

UNIFORMITY Normative notions are to be understood in the same way across domains.

2. The threat to uniformity

EPISTEMIC JUSTIFICATION A person is justified in believing P on a certain basis if and only if, in the nearby epistemically possible worlds in which that basis obtains, P is true. (Whiting 2020)

Alternative modal spaces Nearby metaphysically possible worlds. (Littlejohn 2017; Sutton 2007; Williamson Forthcoming)
Relative to what the person can know a priori. (Pritchard 2005)
Normal worlds. (Smith 2016)

LOTTO Lily holds a ticket in a lottery, there are 1000 tickets in total, and the winning ticket is drawn at random.

ETHICAL JUSTIFICATION A person is justified to Φ if and only if the reasons for them to Φ are as weighty as the reasons for them not to Φ . (Kearns 2016, 178; Parfit 2011, 34; Schroeder 2015)

3. Fundamental and derivative reasons

A distinction: There are fundamental reasons for acting. And there are non-fundamental or derivative reasons for acting—reasons that stand in a suitable relation to the fundamental reasons. (Cullity 2018, 424–25; Nair 2016; Star 2015)

Examples: Nishi's text to Miyuki; Maria and thirsty Carlos.

4. A modal relation

MODAL# R is a reason for a person to Φ if and only if:
(i) F is a fundamental reason for them to Φ .
(ii) in some nearby world in which R obtains, F obtains.

A plausible idea: There is one and only one fundamental reason for believing a proposition, namely, that it is true.

5. More mismatch

The problem:	In EPISTEMIC JUSTIFICATION, the relationship between the fundamental and derivative reason is, not just modal, but modally robust.
MODAL##	R is a reason for a person to Φ if and only if: (i) F is a fundamental reason for them to Φ . (ii) in all nearby worlds in which R obtains, F obtains.
LOTTO+	Lily is offered a ticket in a lottery at no cost. There are 1000 tickets in total and a ticket is drawn at random. If Lily's ticket is drawn, it benefits Lucy.

6. Unity regained

Suggestion:	Consider reasons <i>against</i> in addition to reasons for.
MODAL ₁	R is a reason for a person to Φ if: (i) F is a fundamental reason against their Φ ing. (ii) in all nearby worlds in which R obtains, F does not obtain.
Example:	Franklin and allergy-suffering Sally.
MODAL###	R is a reason for a person to Φ if: (i) F is a fundamental reason against their Φ ing. (ii) in some nearby world in which R obtains, F does not obtain.
LOTTO++	Lily is offered a ticket in a lottery at no cost, there are 1000 tickets, one is drawn at random, and, if Lily's is drawn, Lucy will be harmed.
MODAL ₂	R is a reason for a person to Φ if: (i) F is a fundamental reason for them to Φ . (ii) in some nearby world in which R obtains, F obtains.
Another plausible idea:	There is one and only one fundamental reason against believing a proposition, namely, that it is untrue.
MODAL _E	R is a reason for a person to believe P only if, in all nearby worlds in which R obtains, P.
The final step:	Moving from the contributory to the overall.

7. Alternatives to going modal

Explanation?	Explanatory connections ground modally robust connections. But explanatory connections are not necessary .
Probability?	Corresponding to probabilities are the proportions of worlds. But cases like LOTTO++ show that probability-raising is not sufficient.

8. Conclusion

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