

## **Making the Unity of Normativity Safe Again**

A guiding assumption of much recent work on normativity is that it is uniform across domains. Normative notions are to be understood in the same way whether they figure in discourse concerning moral, epistemic, prudential, or aesthetic matters.

The uniformity assumption is increasingly widespread and influential. But it is not unproblematic. In epistemology, a number of philosophers analyse justification by appeal to *modal* notions. Roughly, a person is justified in believing a proposition if and only if that proposition is true in nearby or normal possible worlds. Justification is a normative notion, one which has application across domains. So, given the uniformity assumption, we should expect modal notions to appear in discussions of justification in, say, ethics. But that is not what we find. Instead, the tendency there is to explain justification in terms of reasons. Roughly, a person is justified in doing something just in case their reasons provide sufficient support for it. It seems, then, that there is a mismatch between the way in which normative notions are understood in epistemology and in ethics. In this paper, I try to resolve this situation by developing a novel theory of reasons, one which makes central appeal to modal notions. By ‘modalizing’ reasons in this way, I suggest, we can reconcile the way ethicists and epistemologists understand justification, and thereby preserve the uniformity assumption.